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ABSTRACT
Since its appearance in the late 1980s, the concept of good governance has 
become a nearly unavoidable part of development discourse emanating from 
international organizations such as the World Bank. Nonetheless, the concept 
has been criticized by scholars due to its tendency to be used as a justification 
for policies and projects which depoliticize power relations and neoliberal 
economics. Drawing on a framework of power in global governance, the case 
of the World Bank’s Demand for Good Governance project in Cambodia is 
examined and several of the critiques of the concept of good governance are 
found to be justified in practice.
Building on the case study and the history of the idea of good governance and 
its critics, a reconceptualization is presented in an attempt to redefine the 
concept and avoid some of its issues by allowing it to be purely contextually 
defined via participation and ‘’repolitization’’.  
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The world of international development is composed of a multitude of different actors 
that possess different sizes and fulfill different roles and niches. By any standards, the 
World Bank is considered one of the major players in the field and is relatively unique 
in that it possesses both formal economic resources via its access to a very significant 
amount of funds and the ideological power via the influence it exercises over donors 
and other actors. In this sense, the World Bank’s position is particularly important in 
that it is one of the few actors able to directly translate its ideas into concrete projects 
and strongly support their adoption in developing countries via major funding support. 
While acknowledging this, it is important to not make the mistake of assuming that the 
World Bank’s views on development have remained the same since its founding. 
Indeed, as a child of the Cold War, its ideological base has always been firmly 
capitalist and free market oriented. Nonetheless, within these parameters, there have
been a variety of competing approaches and particular intellectual trends that have 
risen to prominence or fallen out of favour within the World Bank. For instance, this 
can be easily seen in the evolution of the World Bank’s view on the role of the state in 
development.1
Another related area in which the impact of competing views within the World Bank 
has left its mark is in conception of good governance. First, a literature review of the 
major critiques and responses to the concept put forward by the World Bank will be 
                                                            
1 In the context of this dissertation and to avoid confusion, the term ‘’development’’ will be 
generally employed in the conventional ‘’mainstream’’ sense of the word used by major 
organizations working in the development field, meaning that it is essentially used to signify 
increased economic growth and improved social welfare in the general sense. There exists a 
wealth of literature proposing a critical re-evaluation of the term which unfortunately falls 
mostly outside the scope of this dissertation. Please refer to Rist, 2003 for further reading. 
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conducted in order to identify competing conceptions of good governance and of its 
application in development aid and financing. Several different streams of critique and 
response to the concept will be identified within the two supporters and skeptics of 
good governance. Ultimately, the aim of the literature review will not be to simply 
identify and catalogue the intellectual debate around the concept of good governance 
but to provide us with a solid base for a re-elaboration of the concept in the final part 
of the dissertation. 
Following the literature review, an analytical framework adapted from Barnett and 
Duvall’s theorisation of power in global governance will be presented with the aim of 
applying it to the Cambodian case study in order to illustrate how different types of 
power work to produce a depoliticized form of good governance.
Following the presentation of the analytical framework, the dissertation will attempt to 
trace the history of the concept of good governance and the World Bank’s role in its 
promotion and evolution. The dissertation will explain the initial optimism towards the 
role of the state in developmental theory followed by its rejection via the structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs). The failure of the SAPS then led to the rise of good 
governance discourse promoted by the World Bank to partially explain why the SAPs 
had failed without having to majorly re-examine the assumptions of neoliberal 
economics that formed the basis of the SAPs. 
The penultimate section of this dissertation will consist of a case study of the World 
Bank’s Demand for Good Governance project in Cambodia. This case study will be 
used to demonstrate the Bank’s continuing usage of good governance as a method to 
increase its productive power and maintain relevance. The World Bank’s DFGG 
project in Cambodia has been chosen for this dissertation due to its significance as a 
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flagship World Bank project focused exclusively on governance issues. The 
Cambodian case is also relevant to the theoretical aspect of the thesis considering that 
it showcases some of the problematic aspects of the World Bank’s focus on the 
shallow inclusion of civil society actors in good governance and its focus on 
technocratic fizes to political problems. The case study also illustrates the necessity of 
a reconceptualization taking academic critiques into account in order to ‘’democratize’’ 
the concept of good governance. This Cambodian example serves to demonstrate that 
while the World Bank has updated its rhetoric on good governance to include civil 
society groups as partners, their influence remains weak and the interaction of 
different forms of power between those involved in the project produce a depoliticized 
form of good governance, which benefits both the Bank and the Cambodian 
government in different ways.
The final part of the dissertation will attempt to reconceptualize the idea of good 
governance and draw on its critiques to redefine the concept in a way which can 
provide guidance while avoiding ‘’universal solutionism’’, acknowledging the 
importance of politics and power and position external actors as equals to those they 
purport to help.  
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II. Literature Review
Since its ‘’official’’ beginning after the end of World War II and President Truman’s 
Point Four Program2, the field of international development has adopted its own set of 
expressions in tune with the academic trends of the era and developed a jargon of its 
own which can be nebulous and daunting to outsiders. The concept of ‘’Good 
Governance’’ is no exception and following its first major appearance in the World 
Bank’s 1989 Report, it has become a common term adopted by most major donor 
organizations and its meaning has expanded to the extent that some commentators 
have called for the retirement of the term. Regardless of its worth, the term remains in 
use today and actors in the development field regularly characterize interventions with 
the language of good governance. The term has been a source of controversy and there 
have been various major academic responses coming from different perspectives 
which sought to support the new focus on institutions or criticize some aspects of the 
term and contest its usage and the implicit agenda critics associated with the term and 
its proponents. This section of the dissertation will attempt to review the major 
responses to the idea in order to later reformulate the concept of good governance in a 
way that takes into account common critiques. 
                                                            
2 The genesis of international development as a professional field is somewhat controversial 
as some aspects of international development can be concretely linked to colonialism while 
the ideology of development has been traced back to Antiquity. (Rist, 2003)  However, its 
genesis as a professional field in a form similar to today came in the Post-World War II Era. 
(Abrahamsen, p16)
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1. Good Governance or Good Enough Governance? 
As mentioned in the previous section, after 1989, the idea of good governance rapidly 
took hold outside the World Bank and was adopted by other international institutions, 
influencing their work and the form of interventions and projects. The rise of good 
governance also naturally gave birth to scholarship seeking to better understand the 
relationship between good governance and economic growth or other popular 
development indicators. Several scholars believed to have found a strong correlation 
between several common good governance indicators and development outcomes. 
For instance, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón created an index of governance 
indicators and found that ‘’better’’ governance consistently resulted in higher 
economic development indices. The governance indicators chosen consisted of ‘’voice 
and accountability’’, ‘’political instability and violence’’, ‘’governance effectiveness’’, 
‘’rule of law’’, ‘’regulatory burden’’ and finally, ‘’graft’’. (Kaufmann et al, 1999) 
Some responses to the study have criticized an aspect of their methodology, namely, 
that these indices were built from the self-reported perceptions of citizens, enabling 
the possibility of inconsistency between perception and reality. Others have observed 
similar findings and support the idea that institutions rated highly by investors and 
other monitors are the most important factor in economic development. Around the 
same time, prominent scholars such as Jeffrey Sachs argued that institutions and good 
governance were not the key to economic growth and higher incomes. (Sachs, 2001, 
2003) They focused instead on the importance of environmental factors such as 
climate conditions, geographic location and the presence of diseases like malaria as 
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the major factors predicting income levels in developing countries rather than good or 
bad institutions. This led to a wave of studies by proponents of good governance to 
attempt to prove that institutions matter more than environmental factors in 
determining income levels. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson found that good 
institutions were more important than the impact of climate on incomes. They point to 
European colonialism as the cause of an ‘’institutional reversal’’, which resulted in the   
forced implantation of institutions focused on resource extraction in populous areas 
with abundant primary goods, leading to dysfunctional institutions unable to govern 
well after independence. Conversely, they argued that areas which were sparsely 
inhabited prior to colonization encouraged colonizers to settle and create good 
institutions for their own governance, setting themselves up for success after 
independence. (Acemoglu et al, 2001, 2002) Rodrik, Subramian and Trebbi find 
similar results when comparing the effects of institutions on income levels to the 
effects of trade and geographical factors such as the existence of exploitable oil 
resources or the percentage of a country’s territory situated in the tropics. Their 
findings were consistent with the idea that institutions are the most important factor in 
development but warned practioners to refrain from attempting to impose a ‘’one-size-
fits-all’’ form of institutions. (Rodrik et al, 2004)
The concept of good governance has been found useful but flawed by other scholars. 
Preeminent among these is Merilee Grindle. Grindle believes that the concept is useful 
in drawing attention to institutional factors of development but that the impact of good 
governance has been inflated and it is certainly not a panacea that can resolve all 
issues within a country. (Grindle, 2008) Grindle observes that since from 1997 to 2002, 
the concept of good governance dramatically increased in importance in World Bank 
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publications and the number issues linked to the concept went from 46 to 116, 
demonstrating the expansion of the concept across all aspects of development. This is 
problematic because positioning good governance as the source of development does 
not explain how good governance actually develops and why many countries who are 
viewed as successful do not possess good governance by international standards. 
Conversely, there are a number of countries which are credited with good governance 
but are not considered as development successes by donors and researchers, 
particularly when democracy is conflated with good governance. By bringing up these 
examples, Grindle argues that the relationship between development and good 
governance is not as clear as it seems.  To limit the inflation of this idea, Grindle has 
proposed to instead focus on ‘’good enough governance’’ which would focus not on 
the ideal qualities of a government but rather on the minimal characteristics needed to 
support development. In this optic, interventions must be adapted to different local 
contexts and political analysis remains very pertinent to identify what works and what 
doesn’t in each country. This also implies that good governance can be defined in 
differing ways depending on what a population prioritizes.  (Grindle, 2004, 2007) It 
also implies that not all issues related to governance can be addressed at once and 
more limited approaches may have more success. This analysis draws on the work of 
other scholars who have studied the rise of the East Asian developmental states and 
the successes of other countries despite the lack of good governance in the way the 
Bank envisions it. Several other scholars have used Grindle’s concept of good enough 
governance to study the effectiveness of governance focused interventions in very 
varied contexts and have found Grindle’s exhortation to locally focused analysis 
leading to tailored interventions to be useful. (Evans, 2012; Jabeen, 2007; Booth, 
2011) Some have found that a global focus on empowering local government instead 
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of the usual focus on national level governments can be the way to translate good 
enough governance into real contexts, particularly in post-conflict situations. 
(Brinkerhoff and Johnson, 2008)
There are some scholars who see a similarity between the idea of good enough 
governance and the developmental state, particularly in the East Asian context. The 
concept can be used to explain why economic growth and improvement in several 
measures coexisted with corruption and cronyism in other areas. Both models also 
emphasize the need for incremental changes over sudden ones and the importance of 
good governance in some areas. Ultimately, for them, the role of external actors is to 
support potential developmental states instead of trying to create one through their 
interventions. (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007) Some scholars, such as Leftwich, find 
the concept of good governance useful in a similar way but criticize the World Banks 
technical approach which downplays the role of politics in creating developmental 
states. He argues that the World Bank’s focus on the managerial aspects of good 
governance and the democratic focus of Western aid agencies are unlikely to succeed 
in producing either good governance or democracy. (Leftwich, 1993)
2. Good Governance: depoliticizing neoliberalism?
There are many scholars who are critical of the concept of good governance, 
particularly in the form initially presented by the World Bank. A persistent critique of 
the concept of good governance as elaborated by the World Bank and other actors in 
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the development field perceived as being aligned with neoliberalism has been that 
their idea of good governance consists of a ‘’soft’’ way to introduce neoliberal-
inspired policies and governance under the guise of civil society involvement or 
increased accountability. In Disciplining Democracy, Rita Abrahamsen links the idea 
of good governance to neoliberal modernization and argues that the due to the 
unpopularity and failure of the SAPs, the World Bank has pushed a superficial, pared 
down version of democracy in Africa that, if adopted, would result in weak 
democracies geared to serving the needs of international donors instead of their own 
populations. (Abrahamsen, 2000) Abrahamsen starts by showing how, beginning in 
the 1989 report which marked the first official expression of the concept of good 
governance by the World Bank, promoters of the idea have tried to present it as an 
idea rooted in local ‘’traditional’’ concepts and supported by the public. 
First, by linking the idea of good governance up with tradition and civil society 
support, the Bank is able to differentiate its concept from previous concepts or policies 
that have fallen out of favour, such as ‘’modernization’’ or adjustment programs, 
which makes the idea of good governance more palatable in appearance even if it is 
often very similar in practice to older unpopular ideas. It also allows the concept to be 
more easily adopted by governments working with the Bank because they are able to 
claim that the Bank’s recommendations take into account and reflect traditional 
institutions and values, making them appear less controversial. Presenting the idea of 
good governance in this manner also allows proponents of the concept to subtly 
delegitimize the role of the state in development by associating the traditional sector 
and economy with the ‘’modern’’ private sector even if in reality these are distinct and 
sometimes incompatible. (Abrahamsen, 2000, p46-50)
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Second, the discourse of good governance links up free market capitalism with liberal 
democracy and state intervention with authoritarianism, thus, presenting more 
restrictions on the role of the state or even austerity measures as democratic. The 
assumption underlying this is that restricting the state will lead to a decentralization of 
decision making and thus, more popular representativeness and the empowerment of 
civil society within countries adhering to good governance. Abrahamsen also criticizes 
the simple dichotomy established by the World Bank opposing civil society and state, 
noting that reality is not as simple with civil society and the state often blending 
together. Furthermore, this representation ignores the fact that civil society is not 
inherently democratic or undemocratic bur rather heterogeneous and thus casting it as 
necessarily democratic is misleading and serves only to further delegitimize the state 
and give credence to neoliberal policies. 
Abrahamsen’s critique echoes John Harriss’ critique of the World Bank’s adoption of 
the concept of social capital. Similar to Abrahamsen, Harriss argues that the World 
Bank has employed the concept of social capital as elaborated by Robert Putnam in a 
way that depoliticizes relations of power in development. This is done through radical 
simplification and the shallow glorification of civil society as an agent of popular will 
and agency without examining the ways in which some forms of civil society 
associations can end up hindering popular agency and solidify power structures. This 
glorifications is also done at the expense of the state and ultimately legitimizes 
neoliberal policies by positioning civil society as the locus of development, 
delegitimizing state intervention by associating it with past failures and 
authoritarianism. (Harriss, 2001, p111-21)
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Other authors, such as Catherine Weaver and Demmers et al have argued that the 
World Bank’s corruption focused good governance agenda was adopted as a way to 
approach political topics in a seemingly technical fitting with the Bank’s neoliberal 
economics-focused internal culture. (Weaver, 2008, p92-139; Demmers et al, 2004) 
Indeed, as Weaver describes, the World Bank’s internal culture has been dominated by 
economists since its inception and has employed very few other types of social 
scientists until recently. In addition to this, Section 10 of the Articles of Agreement 
explicitly prohibited political activity and this was interpreted in a very strict way until 
the early 1990s. Together, this resulted in an internal culture narrowly focused on 
economics and seemingly apolitical projects until the emergence of the good 
governance agenda. Promoters of this concept were successful in getting it adopted 
due to a confluence of factors which made it compatible with the Bank’s institutional 
culture. 
First, Weaver explains that by presenting the concept of good governance in an 
apolitical and technically focused manner, proponents were able to appeal to the 
economics oriented internal culture of the Bank. This made the topic of governance 
seemingly fit in with other concepts the Bank already employed, such as public sector 
efficiency, privatization, pro-free market legal reform and so on. Kiely links the 
adoption of good governance to the Bank’s need to integrate the emergence of the East 
Asian tigers into its neoliberal model and reinterpret political decision making and 
state interventionism. By reinterpreting the East Asian cases to fit its idea of good 
governance, the Bank attempted to demonstrate that the role of the state was to ensure 
a free market via ‘’market friendly interventions’’ and relatively fair institutions, 
consistent with its neoliberal model. (Kiely, 1998) Similarly, Stein argues that the 
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adoption of the good governance agenda simply consisted of a rebranding of 
neoliberal policies in the 1990s and later in the 2000s as a rebranding of Bank 
activities as a whole as older programs were reclassified and reinterpreted as activities 
pertaining to good governance. (Stein, 2008, p42-45)
Second, promoters of the concept were able to capitalize on the appointment of 
president Wolfensohn and link up good governance with his anti-corruption agenda. 
Additionally, outside pressure from anti-corruption focused NGOs and the United 
States forced the World Bank to at least commit in image to anti-corruption efforts in 
order to appease critics. The contradiction between the Bank’s internal culture of fund 
disbursement and pressure to reduce corruption in Bank projects shaped the form the 
governance agenda took and steered it to be relatively shallow and focused on 
balancing internal and external pressure, preventing serious political engagement. 
While there has been a lot of scholarship on the depoliticizing and neoliberalizing 
aspects of the World Bank’s good governance discourse, others have interpreted it as 
an institutional reaction to the failure of the Structural Adjustment Programs of the 
1980s-early 1990s allowing the Bank to shift the blame on countries and away from 
itself, redeeming its credibility and reforming its expertise. (Best, 2014) This 
interpretation is not incompatible with the one presented previously but serves to 
provide a different explanation for the rise to prominence of the discourse of good 
governance within the Bank and differs in its evaluation of the Bank’s view of the 
state. Jacqueline Best argues that the first appearance of good governance in the 
Bank’s 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa serves to portray countries in the region as 
responsible for the failures of the SAPs instead of admitting that these policies had 
several inherent problems. Thus, rent-seeking behaviour on the part of state elites is 
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cast as one of the main obstacles to development instead of other factors such as the 
structure of the world capitalist economy among others. Following this, the Bank 
developed new forms of expertise pertaining to governance and incorporated them in 
its neoliberal framework. Best argues that the Bank’s has attempted to transform 
Western ideas of governance into universal, ‘’black-boxed’’ facts in which it 
possesses unique expertise, justifying further intervention. This was exemplified by
the adoption of institutionalist economics and the World Bank’s new focus on 
promoting institutional reforms as a solution to development issues. Civil society 
within developing countries was also reconstituted as a group of ‘’citizen-consumers’’, 
whose role is to consume governmental services and judge their efficiency via 
monitoring mechanisms. Following this, the role of the state becomes to provide 
certain services in the most efficient and transparent manner possible. This 
interpretation differs from the post-independence view of the state as the locus of 
development but also differs from the structural adjustment era ‘’hardcore’’ neoliberal 
view espousing the most minimal state possible. Under this new paradigm, the state is 
encouraged to provide some services, as long as it is done in an efficient manner. 
Countries are then graded and ranked according to newly developed indicators 
measuring various aspects of good governance and compete among each other for 
funding. For Best, the Bank’s embrace of civil society and institutional reform 
constitutes an example of the productive power of international organizations, as 
outlined by Michael Barnett in the framework presented in the next session of the 
dissertation. This dynamic will be further examined in the Cambodian Demand for 





To interpret the case study presented in this dissertation, Michael Barnett and 
Raymond Duvall’s framework of the four different types of power, presented in Power 
in Global Governance (2005) will be used. In their book, Barnett and Duvall draw on 
the mass of rich scholarship concerned with power and its different forms of 
manifestation to identify four different types of power in global governance. While 
this framework was not directly developed to apply to the concept of good governance, 
the discourse of good governance itself certainly forms part of the larger sphere of 
global governance and can constitute an expression of power. Indeed, global 
governance is generally interpreted as being the management of issues on a global 
scale via more or less open and participatory global institutions. For instance, the 
management of trade issues through the World Trade Organization. Additionally, 
international organizations such as the World Bank are often able to use their power to 
set priorities and define issues and their solutions at the global scale.
However, Barnett and Duvall rightly point out that the critical idea of power relations 
in the context of global governance has been mostly ignored and the narrative of 
liberal institutionalism has held strong despite the obvious fact that institutions are
never really neutral and can be utilized to project power in various ways. The 
framework created by the authors helps illustrate the four different types of power 
which are present within global institutions in a direct or diffuse manner. The concept 
of good governance can be interpreted as an extension of the way in which actors 
involved in global governance attempt to project power via discourse and ideological 
constructs. 
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The framework developed by Barnett and Duvall establishes four different types of
power that work in different ways. The first of these is also the most overt and well 
known form of power: compulsory direct power. Compulsory direct power is not 
particularly complicated, it is the ability to force another party to perform an action 
through the direct use of force. Generally, this is not a very subtle form of power. 
However, it is important to note that Barnett and Duvall alter the definition of power 
which they borrow from Robert Dahl (1957) to allow the possibility of power being 
exercised in an unintentional way. Thus, actors can exercise compulsory power on 
others without being aware of it through the unintended consequences of their actions. 
Compulsory power can also be deployed in non-physical ways by an actor to pressure 
another into doing something. For instance, a country putting diplomatic pressure on 
another or investigative journalists exposing unethical acts by government officials to 
try and make them step down or change. 
The second type of power identified by Barnett and Duvall is institutional power. Here, 
the expression of power becomes more subtle as actors attempt to control others in an 
indirect fashion via the rules of a particular institution. To do this, an actor does not 
need to completely control a particular institution but merely needs to have significant 
influence over it. For instance, this can take the form of influence over the creation of 
its rules and formal structure. The establishment of the World Bank itself can be seen 
as an example of this form of power. Without going into too much detail about the 
Bank’s long history, the World Bank and the other Bretton Woods institutions were 
clearly intended to serve as a vehicle for Western and particularly US interest in the 
post-World War II era. (Peet, 2009)
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The third type of power in the framework is structural power. Structural power is 
usually exercised in a more direct way as it essentially consists of power derived from 
the structural or social position of two actors in their relationship. To put it simply, the 
position of actors in a certain system or structure represents a power relationship that 
constrains how they are able to act. Not only does their position in the structure 
determine what actions they are able to take but it also defines what they view as their 
interests. A classic example of this is the concept of social class. Social class 
influences how people perceive the world, how they are perceived by others, restricts 
or expands their potential options and shapes how they view themselves. In the 
international field, the neoliberal world order and the institutions it has spawned can 
be seen as a similar system, albeit with a certain form of ‘’fairness’’ present by design 
in order to bolster the system’s legitimacy and make the status quo relatively 
sustainable. (Kapstein in Barnett, Duvall, p89-101, 2005) The ability of the IFIs to 
make various countries accept loans and assistance with heavy conditionality during 
the structural adjustment period of the 1980s and 1990s can also be seen as a result of 
structural power. Indeed, as Jacqueline Best points out, while countries were free to 
refuse the assistance offers of the IFIs, the consequence of doing so would be serious 
balance of payment crises, international criticism and isolation along with economic 
recession. (Best, p61-2, 2014) Thus, the structure of the international system 
essentially forced countries to accept conditionality and remain in the good grace of 
the IFIs. 
Finally, the fourth type of power in the framework: productive power. This type of 
power is particularly relevant to the concept of global governance as it is the 
production of ideology or discourse which influences actors in a way similar to the 
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structural form of power. The creation and reinterpretation of ideas and concepts 
within a particular field creates shared meanings and understandings that determines 
what actors see as acceptable, abnormal or ideal which, in turn, can serve as 
justification for the exercise of power. Labels and identities created by such types of 
discourse also shapes how actors perceive each other and themselves. 
The concept of ‘’good governance’’ itself serves a prime example of a constructed 
discourse which serves to create categories that classify policies and potential actions 
as acceptable or not and thus delimit the boundaries that actors are allowed to operate 
in and discouraged to overstep. 
Visually summarized, Barnett and Duvall summarize their typology of power like this: 
Figure 1.







Interactions of specific actors Compulsory Institutional
Social relations of constitution Structural Productive
                                                            
3
Table reproduced from Barnett and Duvall, 2005, p12
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This framework has been chosen over other potential options due to its direct 
application to the analysis of the case studies as a function of its identification of 
diverse types and sources of power. The framework, with the inclusion of productive, 
structural and institutional forms of power can help us understand some of the sources 
of the World Bank’s authority and power along with its ability to produce the 
discourse of good governance and associate developmental successes with the concept, 
further bolstering its credibility and presence in the field of development. The case of 
Cambodia will be examined in order to illustrate how these four types of power 
intersect in the World Bank’s Demand for Good Governance project. The purpose of 
identifying the typology of power in the Cambodian project will be to demonstrate 
that the concept of good governance remains a source of power and authority for the 
World Bank despite the nominal inclusion of civil society groups. The Bank’s 
approach to good governance in Cambodia will be portrayed as a conservative middle 
ground which serves to depoliticize the political economy of corruption and ‘’bad 
governance’’ in order to present it to government and civil partners as a problem 
resolvable by technically focused intervention spearheaded by itself.
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IV. The State, Neoliberalism and the Emergence of 
Good Governance
The history of the concept of ‘’Good Governance’’ is linked with the major Bretton 
Woods Institutions (BWIs) working with developing countries, namely, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and especially the World Bank (WB). These 
institutions were responsible for promoting the term and its adoption in the vocabulary 
of development practitioners and academics in the late 1980s. To understand where 
the term comes from and its meaning, it is critical to place it within the historical and 
institutional context from which it emerged. 
1. The state as a motor of development
Perceptions of the role of the state in development have greatly shifted during the 20th
century. In the post-World War II world, development theorists posited that state 
intervention and leadership in the domestic economy of developing countries would 
allow them to create a ‘’big push’’ and rapidly develop their economies. Several 
influential post-war thinkers believed that the state would be able to support the 
emerging national private sector industries by investing in them and providing them 
with the support they needed to flourish. Naturally, there was significant debate 
around the specifics of what this would entail but it can be said that there was a 
general optimism towards the state’s capacity to bring about development. 
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Some scholars, notably Arthur Lewis, believed that the essentially unlimited
unproductive surplus labour in the massive agricultural sector of developing countries
would be able to be channeled by the state into working for development. To do this, 
the state would need to intervene and break the bottleneck in the economy which 
appeared as a consequence of the lack of skilled labour, productive resources and 
capital in developing countries. To do this, the state could provide credit to 
industrialists and work to maintain a balance via taxation and regulation between the 
industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy to ensure that optimal productivity 
is achieved. (Lewis, 1954, p189-191) (Polanyi, 2008) Concretely, this meant more 
than simply providing the industries with access to the credit they needed. This 
implied that the state would play a critical role in the economy by building the 
required infrastructure to ensure that industry would have access to the necessary 
technological inputs and markets, provide adequate access to education and healthcare 
for workers and so on. 
Notably, around the same time, W.W. Rostow’s infamous evolutionary model of 
development outlined in The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto, also became influential among government officials in the West interested 
in bolstering the strength of allied developing countries against the threat of 
communism. Rostow’s theory positioned countries in a teleological continuum with 5 
different stages through which a country would be able to progress as it developed.
(Rostow, 1960). While Rostow’s theory was obviously and unapologetically capitalist, 
much like in Miller’s model, the state had a large role to play in ensuring that the 
‘’take off’’ would happen via the funneling of profits into industrial investment and 
the dissemination of modern science, technology and infrastructure. Additionally, the 
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state was expected to play a centralizing nation-building role to bring the disparate 
social classes and interest groups which coexisted in traditional society into the 
developing capitalist economy. 
Other development theorists, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, focused on 
examining the unfavourable terms of trade which characterized economic relations 
and commerce between developing and developed countries. Indeed, in general, they 
believed that by mostly exporting and producing primary commodities, developing 
countries locked themselves into dependency on the West and other industrialized 
trade partners and would never really be able to develop without breaking this 
exploitative relationship. The analysis of the precise economic mechanics behind this 
dependent relationship differed to an extent among dependency theorists but, generally, 
the idea was that countries producing finished goods were able to continuously profit 
from the plus value generated by the transformation of imported raw materials into 
finished goods resold in primary resource exporting countries. Thus, resource 
exporting countries were generally believed to be in a disadvantageous position as 
they were unable transform their own resources into finished goods and mostly had to 
import these goods from abroad, rendering them dependent on imports.
Like the other influential post-war development thinkers briefly mentioned, the 
dependency theorists also viewed the state as critical in fostering development. To do 
this, the state needed to break the dependence on foreign imports by creating domestic 
industry capable of producing finished goods and encouraging self-reliance. This 
could be done through various means, notably via heavy subsidies to allow industry to 
acquire the capital it needed to start the process or through the state ownership of key 
industries. 
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During this period, the World Bank was happy to provide funds to developing 
countries in order to help them enact their ambitious development plans and prevent 
the spread of communism, consistent with the ideas presented by Truman in his Point 
Four program and later, Robert McNamara. While the Bank remained committed to 
free market capitalism, states were seen as important and necessary technical 
managers of development and the Bank loaned large amounts of money to states 
involved in poverty reduction, basic infrastructure construction and meeting basic 
needs during Robert McNamara’s presidency. (Peet, p135-136, 2009)
Unfortunately, for various reasons, reality did not play out as the theorists had hoped 
and very few developing countries were able to successfully ‘’take off’’ as they had 
hoped. Optimism towards the state’s capacity to bring about development melted 
away as serious issues with import substitution industrialization and other state-led 
development strategies became apparent in the late 1970s and 1980s. This resulted in 
an influx of theories and concepts seeking to explain what had gone wrong and why 
reality had fallen far short of what was promised. 
2. Disillusionment towards the state and the rise of neoliberalism
Coinciding with the disappointing results of development efforts throughout the world, 
scepticism towards the involvement of the state in the economy had independently 
risen to prominence within the West, as neoliberal economics became the most 
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popular branch of economics and governments pledging to reform and reduce the 
presence of the state were elected in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) were not immune to the spread of 
neoliberalism and were also put in the position of having to respond to the economic 
problems and crises which were appearing primarily in Latin America and Africa. 
Taking advantage of the difficult economic situation in several developing countries, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the BWIs were able to leverage their considerable 
power as development financiers and their credibility as ‘’neutral’’ and ‘’apolitical’’ 
technical experts to propose a solution to restore economic stability and growth to the 
developing world. (Best, 2014, p48) The solution put forth by the IMF and the World 
Bank came in the form of the infamous Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).
While the SAPs differed to an extent depending on which country they were being 
implemented in and which institution they were being designed by, the common 
thread which held the programs together was their attempt to push governments into 
adopting economic austerity measures. Concretely, this could take the form of 
privatization of state owned enterprises, reorientation of the economy towards an 
export focus, reduction or elimination of subsidies on various goods or industries and 
the reduction of social welfare measures. 
Following their implementation, it became quickly apparent that the SAPs were 
certainly not as effective as promised and their results were mixed to say the least. 
Indeed, on pure economic grounds, the SAPs were mostly unable to deliver the 
economic growth they had promised and financial liberalization did not succeed in 
creating a competitive export-oriented industrial base in most countries which adopted 
SAPs. Furthermore, the SAPs seemed to have worsened poverty and precarity in many 
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countries. This was particularly evident in sub-Saharan Africa, where the abolition of 
various subsidies on vital services and products led to significant increases in the price 
of staple goods and healthcare, contributing to increased marginalization of the poor. 
(Peet, p158-162, 2010) 
Naturally, the SAPs were extremely unpopular in most developing countries and led to 
social unrest and increased hardship for a significant amount of people in targeted 
countries as the subsidized goods they relied on shot up in price and newly elected 
governments were forced to break their electoral promises and cut back expenses to 
please creditors. Ultimately, the SAPs were harshly criticized and the BWIs were 
forced to admit that they had not lived up to expectations. This greatly undermined the 
credibility of the IMF and the World Bank considering that it relied on their so-called 
technical expertise which had failed to deliver results in a spectacular way as several 
of the SAP adopting countries failed to show any significant development as a result 
of the adoption of the programs. (Best, 2014, p74-76, 85) A few years later, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic failure of neoliberal marketization 
policies (shock therapy) supported by the IMF and the World Bank further damaged 
the credibility of these institutions and their ability to stabilize economic conditions 
and create prosperity. (Weaver, 2008, p96-97)
However, for the BWIs, what was at fault was not the design of the SAPs but rather 
the lack of commitment on the part of recipient countries and imperfect 
implementation of the recommended policies. In their view, the fault of the 
international institutions lay with faulty assumptions about how institutions functioned 
within the countries adopting the SAPs. Thus, the task of fixing these malfunctioning 
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institutions by increasing their efficiency, accountability and transparency became part 
of the solution proposed by the World Bank. (Weaver, 2008, p96, 98) 
3. Good Governance: The return of politics at the World Bank
The failure of the SAPs led the World Bank to expand its range of operations into 
more clearly political fields, namely, the construction and reform of governance 
institutions as a way to distance itself from the failures of the past and remain relevant. 
(Abrahamsen, 2000, p49) During the late 1980s, governance issues slowly started 
being approached in World Bank discourse on Sub-Saharan Africa as a report 
examining the region’s economic crisis clearly cast the region’s lack of proper 
governance as one of the major sources of its problems. The inclusion of governance 
issues in the report was also inspired by the input of African scholars, who were 
concerned with the lack of development under authoritarian regimes but also by the 
numerous problems stemming from the Bank’s SAPs. (Mkandawire, 2007) While a 
relatively minor part of the overall report, a section pointed to the lack of free press 
and accountability, patronage politics and corruption fuelled by Western aid as sources 
of the ‘’governance crisis’’ in Sub-Saharan Africa. (World Bank, 1989, p60-61) This 
was not without controversy as Section 10 of the Bank’s founding Articles of 
Agreement prohibited the Bank from engaging in political matters: The Bank and its 
officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be 
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members 
concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and 
these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes 
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stated in Article I. (IBRD, 1989, Section 10) Despite being clearly associated with the 
United States during the Cold War and certainly using obviously political criteria for 
project selection in many cases during the Cold War period, the Bank had always tried 
to present itself as neutral by focusing solely on ‘’technical’’ programs. This had
traditionally been viewed as one of key strengths of the Bank which allowed it to 
expand its power and authority in the field of development. Compared to more 
technical programs such as general financial assistance and loans for infrastructure 
construction, the Bank’s entry into the field of governance could not be easily 
portrayed as apolitical considering the fundamental nature of the topic. At the same 
time, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western donor countries active in the 
Bank became increasingly interested in governance reform for the newly dependent 
post-Soviet countries. Combined with the increasing prominence of the discourse of 
governance and institutionalism in academia, the topic of governance became 
unavoidable. (Weaver, 2008, p106) This created enough unease within the Bank to 
force the Bank’s top legal advisor to reinterpret Section 10 and develop a legal 
framework so that the Bank could engage in programs pertaining to governance 
without issue. (Lateef, 2016, p3-4) The new framework allowed the Bank to promote 
governance reform programs as long as the Bank did not get involved in partisan 
politics or favour a particular party within a country over others and maintained the 
appearance of neutrality. The Bank would also only be able to support governance 
reform initiatives if they were being undertaken for primarily economic reasons, 
meaning that it would not be able to support democratization efforts but it would be 
able to support increased monitoring mechanisms and anti-corruption programs. This 
shaped the form of what the Bank would promote as good governance and the types of 
projects it would get involved in. A discussion paper on governance issued in 1991 to 
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support the reinterpretation of Section 10, outlines key areas of governance in which 
the Bank can assist: improving public sector management, accountability, 
predictability and the legal framework for development and lastly, information and 
transparency. (World Bank 1991, p8-12) While the concept of ‘’good governance’’ 
itself is not clearly defined by the Bank in the paper, it can be inferred that it is mostly 
in tune with neoliberalism, with the state’s role being to provide some public services 
and functioning legal institutions to support the free market in exchange for the tax 
revenue from citizens to finance these. Even if good governance itself is not precisely 
defined, what constitutes ‘’poor governance’’ is. Indeed, poor governance is defined in 
the report as states making no distinction between private and public goods leading to 
the misuse of public funds, legal systems that are unpredictable or corrupt, the 
presence of too much ‘’bureaucratic red tape’’ hindering the development of the 
market and non-transparent decision making in public administration. (World Bank 
1991, p5-6). There is no mention of the environment and human rights, most likely to 
avoid any potential issue under Section 10 of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement. The 
concept of good governance was gradually adopted precisely due to its relative 
vagueness and flexibility in the sense that it can incorporate aspects of both public 
management and political activity without having to clearly commit to a particular 
political system or set of precise policies. (Doornbos, 2003, p7)
Governance issues became somewhat mainstream in the World Bank with the 
appointment of James Wolfensohn as president of the World Bank and his infamous 
1996 ‘’Cancer of Corruption’’ speech which essentially positioned the issue of 
corruption as the fundamental factor holding back countries from economic 
development. (Best, 2014, p120) Consequently, at this point, the Bank remained
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primarily concerned with trying to reduce rent-seeking behaviour within states and 
reducing corruption in the hope that it would foster economic development. However, 
this mainstreaming was hampered by the fact that the Bank’s staff was mostly 
composed of economists who had a rather shallow understanding of how institutions 
actually form and change. Programs adopted by the Bank thus tended to be conceived 
from a mostly top-down perspective and attempted to change institutions within 
developing countries in the same way. The Bank’s institutional culture also favoured 
fund disbursement above all else, hampering the depth of anti-corruption efforts that 
could have resulted in less fund disbursement. (Weaver, 2008, p113-115, 121-2) This 
led the Bank to satisfy itself with the creation of new monitoring institutions and 
changing formal institutional structures to reduce corruption via laws or conditionality 
in loans without actually trying to understand why these institutions had developed in 
such a way or what purpose informal institutions such as patronage networks played in 
certain countries. In rhetoric, the Bank acknowledged these problems and the 
cultural/historical differences between countries which affected how institutions 
evolved but in practice, the Bank’s institutional culture favouring narrow 
economically focused projects, top-down design and fund disbursement hindered the 
creation of long term, country-adapted, demand driven projects in the field of 
governance. (Weaver, 2008, p117-120)
4. Good governance in the Post-Washington Consensus era
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The concept of good governance initially served as a way for the Bank to support its 
policies and recommendations in the wake of the failure of the structural adjustment 
programs while remaining mostly consistent with the dominant neoliberal ideology 
within the Bank. The political nature of good governance also gave the Bank more 
latitude to manoeuvre in when it came to policy recommendations and allowed it to 
support anti-corruption programs that it believed would make the state more efficient 
but also bolster the trust of donor countries who would feel more secure that their 
funds were not being wasted. However, as the discourse of good governance became 
more mainstream, its meaning started evolving further. The World Bank’s idea of 
good governance may have been originally conceived as a relative narrow technocratic 
concept emphasizing the necessity of transparent, rational and accountable state 
management but, as its flaws became apparent, the concept expanded to include more 
overtly political ideas as it was adopted by development actors other than the World 
Bank. This was further compounded by the fact that the influence of ‘’hardcore’’ 
neoliberalism within the Bank was waning in the latter half of the 1990s. (Best, 2014, 
p48-9, 150-1) Indeed, the idea that economic growth would ensure development alone 
became increasingly challenged as some countries experienced significant economic 
growth but also enduring poverty, inequality and unrest. Furthermore, the idea of 
governance conditionality as a way to force governments to implement reforms also 
went out of favour as it became clear that conditionality was far less effective than 
what had been envisioned and mostly succeeded in harming relations between donors, 
recipient countries and civil society groups. Additionally, in addition to the stream of 
criticisms that had been directed at the World Bank after the failure of the SAPs, the 
Bank became the subject of more criticism from groups that had their rights violated 
in various ways as a side-effect of Bank projects.
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Together, this resulted in what has been described as the ‘’post-Washington 
Consensus’’ era at the World Bank. (Carroll, 2010, p21-5) This period is characterized 
by the World Bank’s promotion of a softer version of neoliberal policies which allow 
a more significant role for the state and tries to foster ownership of Bank 
recommended reforms through ownership instead of conditionality. The post-
Washington Consensus era is also characterized by the spread of the discourse of good 
governance across all actors in the development field and the subsequent expansion of 
the term. Indeed, the term has been adopted by most major aid agencies and has 
expanded to incorporate differing elements perceived as ‘’good’’ to the extent that 
ascribing a particular overall meaning to the concept is rather difficult. As Gisselquist 
notes; good governance means different things not only to different organizations, but 
also to different actors within these organizations. (Gisselquist, 2012, p21)
Additionally, the purported benefits of good governance have greatly increased over 
time as the idea became credited with positive effects in poverty reduction, 
environmental conservation, land reform, eradication of HIV/AIDS, labour standards 
and much more. (Grindle, 2008, p8) However, while there have been some 
contradictions and changes within the World Bank regarding the meaning of the term 
‘’good governance’’, its core meaning has generally remained consistent with the 
initial conceptualization of the term. The Bank remained focused on accountability 
and transparency, with some occasional more overtly political additions related to 
representativity of government. In the words of Paul Wolfowitz, president of the 
World Bank from 2005-2007: We call it good governance. It is essentially the 
combination of transparent and accountable institutions, strong skills and competence, 
and a fundamental willingness to do the right thing. Those are the things that enable a 
government to deliver services to its people efficiently. (World Bank, 2007, p1) During 
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his short term, Wolfowitz attempted to make anti-corruption efforts central at the 
World Bank to an unprecedented extent but was perceived as too confrontational by 
some donors and faced opposition within the Bank due to his own hypocrisy in the 
matter and his misunderstanding of World Bank institutional culture. (Weaver, 2008, 
p135-6)
Another way that the World Bank responded to some of the failures and criticisms 
regarding its first iteration of the concept of good governance has been to try and 
include the ‘’demand’’ side of good governance in projects. The aim of this is to try 
and encourage ‘’ownership’’ of its recommendations by including civil society groups 
in some of its projects and tailoring its approach to issues that are particularly relevant 
to a particular country as outlined by both its government and some domestic civil 
society groups. The aptly named ‘’Demand for Good Governance’’ framework 
developed by the Bank constitutes an example of this that will be examined in the 
Cambodian case study later in the dissertation. The Cambodian case study is 
significant in illustrating that despite the evolution of the Bank’s discourse and its 
focus on citizen ‘’demand’’ for good governance, in practice, it does not seem like 
there has been much deviation from previous iterations of the concept and its 
technocratic interpretation serving to increase the World Bank’s power and authority.
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V. Demand for Good Governance, the case of 
Cambodia
In the previous parts of this dissertation, we have examined the history of the concept 
of good governance, in particular its linkage to the World Bank. We have also looked 
over the various responses to the concept that have been developed since the idea has 
become ‘’mainstreamed’’ in the development field. This section will attempt to 
illustrate how the World Bank implements its ideas about good governance in a 
concrete setting, namely, the Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) project in 
Cambodia. The case of Cambodia is also particularly relevant considering that the 
Bank’s activities in the country had been at the centre of accusations about its
corruption enabling disbursement practices and the subsequent blind eye turned by the 
Bank to major ethical issues within its projects in 2007. (Carroll, 2010, p175-177)
Later that year, the accusations levied at the bank about its activities in Cambodia 
were overshadowed by the spectacular professional misconduct scandal implicating 
then president of the World Bank Paul Wolfowitz which ultimately led to his 
resignation. Nonetheless, the increased pressure put on the Bank by its major donors 
over its practices in Cambodia forced the Bank to increase its focus on issues related 
to good governance and anti-corruption in the country. 
Combined with the previous theoretical sections, the aim of this is to acquire an 
adequate understanding of the concept of good governance in practice in order to 
proceed with its reformulation in the final part of the dissertation. Before getting into 
the Cambodia project proper, it is necessary to outline exactly what the Demand for 
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Good Governance consists of to understand the framework which guided the World 
Bank in the designing and implementation of its project in Cambodia. 
The Demand for Good Governance framework comes out of the World Bank’s 
realization that their efforts to foster good governance from ‘’above’’ have not 
generally been very successful. One of the key factors in this failure identified by the 
Bank was that they had been working primarily with the ‘’supply’’ side of good 
governance but were ignoring the ‘’demand’’ side of it, making institutions designed 
with the goal of promoting accountability or transparency have no real roots in society, 
leading to their lack of impact. (Chase and Anjum, p5, 2008) Thus, Bank projects 
within the DFGG umbrella aim to work on the ‘’demand’’ side of good governance 
and support local actors which are pushing for greater accountability, transparency and 
responsiveness on the part of authorities. This is quite a significant step for the Bank 
considering that it has always had to tread extremely carefully when dealing with civil 
society organizations due to its core mandate forcing it to remain ‘’neutral’’ and 
refrain from engaging in politics. 
While it can certainly be argued that the World Bank has always been implicitly 
political and never truly neutral due to the nature of its work and its close ties to the 
United States, the DFGG framework is more explicitly political when compared to 
previous Bank projects which attempted to focus on financing and providing technical 
support. This is particularly obvious in the Bank’s description of social accountability, 
a concept which it elaborated and draws on to explain how it can work with the 
‘’demand’’ side of good governance. 
In one of its papers tracing the conceptual evolution of the DFGG framework, the 
Bank draws on the notion of social accountability, a concept elaborated in the early 
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2000s. The idea of social accountability is usually defined by the Bank as an approach 
towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e. in which it is 
ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or 
indirectly in exacting accountability (World Bank 2004 in Ackermann 2005) The idea 
behind this is that relying exclusively on the government or designated agencies to 
monitor actors and ensure that they remain accountable to the public is unrealistic, 
therefore, the public needs to be brought in and also participate in the process. The 
official actors charged with monitoring others may have very little capacity to do so 
due to a lack of funding or may have incentives to turn a blind eye to abuses for 
various reasons. In theory, bringing in the public to assist in monitoring can help to 
avoid this. Social accountability projects aim to do this by increasing the engagement 
of the public in issues related to transparency, accountability and equitable governance 
by empowering and encouraging them to speak out when they witness corruption and 
unethical behaviour. Within the DFGG framework, the bank identified four key pillars 
that would guide its efforts. (World Bank Social Development Department Demand 
for Good Governance Team, 2010) 
The first of these pillars is the promotion of demand, which refers to the provision of 
access to information to civil society actors that can support their ability to demand 
improvements in governance. Second, the Bank outlines the necessity for demand to 
be mediated. The Bank believes that for demand to be effective, it must be mediated 
and moderated through institutions in order for it to be more acceptable for the state 
actor receiving the demand. Third, agencies receiving governance feedback on the part 
of civil society must be able to respond adequately and meet expectations. The final 
pillar of the Bank’s DFGG framework is the process of demand monitoring. For a 
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virtuous cycle of sorts to be created, there must be monitoring of the entire process 
and dissemination of information to civil society groups which allows for 
improvements to be made and a continuous loop of refinement and actualization of the 
demand process to be created. While the Bank’s framework is relatively conservative 
in the sense that it aims to moderate and mediate demands made by civil society actors 
in order for them to be rendered palatable for the state, it is clear that the potential 
genuine inclusion of civil society actors is a step forward. 
Directly involving civil society opens up a very wide range of projects to actors 
interested in working within a country compared to working exclusively with the 
authorities. However, projects in this area also run the risk of upsetting local power 
holders who may benefit from the current state of business. Projects aiming to increase 
social accountability are also more inherently and obviously political than most of the 
Bank’s previous projects, risking tensions with partner governments. Nonetheless, the 
DFGG framework aims to increase overall citizen involvement in good governance 
issues via participatory mechanisms and cooperation with authorities sharing the same 
goals and vision as the Bank. 
The World Bank’s Demand for Good Governance project in Cambodia is often 
mentioned in Bank documents as one of its flagship projects focused exclusively on
good governance related issues and incorporates most of the World Bank’s framework 
on the topic. Indeed, the project’s description is very straightforward in establishing its 
objectives and the means it will employ to do so:
The development objective of the proposed project is to enhance the demand for good 
governance (DFGG) in priority reform areas by strengthening institutions, supporting 
partnerships, and sharing lessons.  The state and non-state institutions and partnerships 
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supported will be those that promote, mediate, respond to, or monitor to inform DFGG. 
(World Bank DFGG Cambodia ICR, p9, 2015)
From the start, in rhetoric, the World Bank attempted to create a project that would be 
‘’inclusive and consultative’’ and draw together both civil society and government 
actors, consistent with its DFGG framework which emphasizes that there is ‘’demand’’ 
for good governance, mostly coming from below, that needs to be linked up with the 
‘’supply’’ of good governance, coming from above.
Quite importantly, the World Bank emphasized the moderate nature of its projects by 
characterizing it as gradual, realistic and strategic. (World Bank, 2007b, p3) Putting 
forward the project’s moderate and technical nature allows the World Bank to achieve 
two things. 
First, the promotion of the conservative nature of the program makes it appear less 
threatening to Cambodian authorities, who may be concerned that the Bank’s focus on 
accountability and participation would strengthen the opposition to the regime. Indeed, 
corruption is a hot issue in Cambodian politics and widespread patronage networks 
and clientelism have been vital to the survival and maintenance of the regime in the 
post-Khmer Rouge era. (Un, 2006, p227-8) It is highly likely that the Cambodian 
government did not intend to completely dismantle its system of patronage, which is 
directly linked with its lack of accountability but rather to reform it in a limited but 
visible way. By doing so, the government can show that it is slowly reforming, 
potentially appeasing opposition, while keeping its vital patronage networks in place 
or changing their shape to ensure that they avoid getting revealed by new transparency 
measures. The World Bank is certainly aware of the fact that proposing a project 
which is ‘’too radical’’ would result in tension with the Cambodian government and a 
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lack of cooperation, thus, it employs the discourse of moderation and incremental 
change to reduce the threat posed by the DFGG project. This does not mean that the 
DFGG project is worthless but simply that it has a limited scope and represents a form 
of compromise between the parties involved, consistent with the Bank’s view that 
DFGG is a process which needs to be built over time. (World Bank, 2007, p1-2) This
approach also helps to create local ownership of the DFGG program as it can 
potentially serve the purpose of all actors involved. The Cambodian government is 
able to present reforms and partnerships with civil society as proof of its increased 
accountability and potentially enjoy greater legitimacy with the public, civil society 
groups are able to enact their agenda in a limited way and gain influence while the 
World Bank can build its credentials as an expert in good governance. 
Second, by describing its program as logical, realistic and strategic, the World Bank is 
able to present its program as one that is neutral and merely technical in order to avoid 
potential political conflicts and lay claim to expertise on the topic of governance. The 
World Bank’s loss of technical credibility in the wake of the failure of SAPs across 
the globe have forced it to develop new forms of expertise from which it can derive 
productive power. (Best, 2014, p80) By laying claim to expertise on the topic of good 
governance and describing good governance in technical terms, the World Bank is 
able to expand its productive power and position itself as not only an expert on 
economics but also as an expert in the political management of a country or ‘’good
governance’’. It is not a coincidence that the process of politics and the efforts of civil 
society to increase the government’s responsiveness and accountability are described 
and simplified in the language of economics as ‘’supply’’ and ‘’demand’’. 
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Concretely, the Bank’s project in Cambodia contained several different initiatives 
aimed at supporting both the government and civil society organizations, coherent 
with its rhetoric on creating an inclusive program. To choose its state partners in 
Cambodia, the World Bank consulted the Cambodian government, domestic civil 
society organizations and major donors in the country such as DFID alongside its own 
research. (World Bank, 2007b, p4-5) Additionally, they opted to try and select 
organizations which would cover a wide range of different sectors, in the sense of 
strategic sectors for governance reform such as natural resource management and 
public finance along with different parts of the state, such as the executive and 
judiciary sector. Ultimately, this resulted in the selection of 5 different institutions at 
the onset of the program.
First, the Ministry of National Assembly-Senate Relations and Inspection 
(MONASRI) was selected.  MONASRI is essentially in charge of fighting corruption 
within Cambodia and was chosen to help inform citizens of the rights they possess 
under the Cambodian Land Law and receive complaints when their rights have not 
been respected.
Second, The Arbitration Council, an independent organization which attempts to 
resolve labour disputes was also chosen for participation in order to expand its reach 
and overall ability to function.
Third, Radio National of Kampuchea (RNK), the state funded public radio broadcaster 
was chosen in order to support programming which would give citizens the 
opportunity to interact with government officials and interrogate them regarding 
budgeting and other policies in addition to sponsoring programming about stories 
related to governance. 
40
Fourth, the Ministry of the Interior’s One Stop Window Services (OSWS) / District 
Ombudsman Office was selected in order to scale up their expansion across the 
country and establish offices in major cities for each province that would provide 
governmental services in a transparent and fair manner. 
Finally, a National Assembly Committee was convened to participate in the DFGG 
initiative. The idea behind the selection of these particular institutions was to ensure 
that DFGG capacity building efforts would be able to scale up and reach the largest 
amount of people via the efforts of these institutions, most of which have a core 
purpose that is supportive of good governance. Additionally, the state partners were 
selected to encourage them to build partnerships with civil society organizations via 
the World Bank’s network in Cambodia. 
The assistance to civil society organizations involved in the World Bank’s Cambodia 
DFGG project was planned to take the form of capacity building via workshops and 
training with experts in the field of social accountability. The Bank also planned to set 
up competitions of sort in which civil society organizations would be able to propose 
new ideas and programs to assist in increasing accountability within state institutions 
or other ideas compatible with the general DFGG framework. The World Bank’s 
support for civil society groups would be done via The Asia Foundation (TAF), who 
would essentially implement the Bank’s plan with non-governmental actors and work 
with its partners to monitor state institutions and help scale up their presence and 
coverage within Cambodia. 
The third aspect of the DFGG project in Cambodia was focused on communications, 
monitoring and evaluation and learning. This part of the project essentially aimed to 
provide project partners with capacity building sessions to show them how to better 
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communicate their goals, ongoing initiatives and achievements in good governance. 
This also includes publicity campaigns to disseminate information about the project 
and its goals and create awareness of the issues related to DFGG.
The large scale objective of the project and the results the World Bank hoped to 
achieve are represented in a graph included in a project document and reproduced here. 
Clearly, there is a strong focus on monitoring and data collection as a way to achieve 
good governance and not much mention of potential political processes that can result 
in bad or good governance, consistent with several critiques of the Bank’s conception 
of the idea that have been outlined in the literature review of the dissertation.
Figure 2:4
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Although the project’s overall outcome was deemed ‘’moderately satisfactory’’ in the 
Bank’s post-project Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR), there were 
several major issues identified by the World Bank that came up during the project and 
forced the Bank to modify some aspects of it considerably. (ICR Review, p15, 2015)
Foremost, the Bank was forced to drop both MONASRI and RNK from the program 
and reallocate their planned funding to other aspects to the plan in 2011. It seems that 
the Bank’s optimism in its pre-project plans about the Cambodian government’s 
eagerness to cooperate was somewhat misplaced as the good governance agenda 
pushed by the Bank never really took hold within RNK as an institution and no real 
commitments were made. In the case of MONASRI, the reason behind the failure of 
the Bank’s agenda was more obviously political: the promotion of land rights in 
Cambodia was a source of controversy and civil society actors did not trust the 
ministry enough to work with it. (World Bank, 2015, p24)
Looking at the DFGG project through Barnett’s framework, it is possible to view the 
power relations present in the project beneath the surface. When viewing the project 
this way, much like in other World Bank projects that have been written about, the 
reproduction of power relations present in the international order becomes visible. 
Indeed, the World Bank has been criticized from many different angles by scholars 
who have accused it of sneakily reproducing Washington Consensus style policies in 
its projects, depoliticizing fundamentally political concepts, neglecting the negative 
effect of its policies on human rights, democracy, the environment and much more. A 
particularly obvious example of this is the World Bank’s efforts to push public water 
management privatization to civil society groups during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
under the guise of neutral capacity building and international networking programs. 
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(Goldman, 2005) During this period, the Bank sought to pressure loan recipient 
governments having trouble to repaying their loans to privatize public water services 
in order to raise more funds. To support their efforts, the Bank invoked the language 
of sustainability, rational management and used transnational policy networks to 
recruit civil society organizations engaged in water issues to their viewpoint to create 
the appearance of an international consensus on the issue. (Goldman, 2005, p225-46)
Viewed through the Barnett power framework, the Bank essentially used its 
institutional power to steer the international discussion in a particular way and define 
what would be discussed while pushing away ideas of water management that it 
disliked and promoting those that fit with its vision as ‘’rational’’, ‘’realistic’’ and 
‘’consensual’’. Nonetheless, while the Bank has been harshly criticized, it remains 
viewed as an authority in the field and both academics and states remain open to its 
influence. This may have to do with its inherent authority and power as an 
international organization perceived as embodying rational-liberal norms generally 
accepted by states or viewed as ‘’neutral’’. (Finnemore and Barnett in Barnett, 2005, 
p170-1)
The case of the DFGG project in Cambodia is not as dramatic as some of the 
aforementioned cases but still represents the World Bank’s productive power through 
the particular identification of ‘’bad governance’’ or corruption as a major problem in 
Cambodia and its idea of good governance as a solution to this problem. This does not 
mean that ‘’bad governance’’ or corruption is not a serious issue in Cambodia and has 
been manufactured by the World Bank but rather that it has been singled out as one of 
the major sources of underdevelopment instead of the myriad other potential sources 
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such as Cambodia’s position in the world system and geopolitics or the international 
legal environment which allows the spoils of ‘’bad governance’’ to be stored and spent 
outside of the country. Furthermore, the Bank’s approach to combating ‘’bad 
governance’’ and corruption via the DFGG project is consistent with what critics have 
described as the Bank’s tendency to ‘’fight corruption but not corruptors’’. (Deneault, 
2013, p117-9) By creating elaborate narratives and storylines for its project and 
inviting civil society and the government to design better monitoring institutions, the 
World Bank essentially minimizes the fact that corruption or ‘’bad governance’’ is the 
result of a particular political economy and not the outcome of a lack of monitoring 
mechanisms, further enhancing the Bank’s influence in Cambodia. The World Bank’s 
ability to identify the lack of good governance in Cambodia and present it essentially 
as an issue that can be resolved through mostly technical solutions such as capacity 
building efforts, better monitoring and limited inclusion of civil society groups instead 
of addressing the domestic and international factors which give rise to ‘’bad 
governance’’ and allow it to thrive in the first place constitutes a clear example of the 
use of productive power by the World Bank. The Bank is also able to propagate its 
conception of good governance in the capacity building sessions that it hosts in the 
context of the project, potentially influencing how participants perceive the concept.
By deploying its productive power through the framing of issues in a particular way, 
the World Bank is able to maintain its technical expertise and authority despite the 
clearly political topic of good governance and state-civil society relations. 
The ‘’partnership’’ structure of the project allowing the Bank to select government 
and civil society partners in its project and act as a mediator of sorts between actors 
create a dynamic which contributes to and reinforces the institutional power of the 
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Bank in Cambodia. Indeed, while the Bank clearly attempted to create an inclusive 
project, involuntarily, the institutional arrangement of the project creates a hierarchy 
of power in which the World Bank is able to assert its expertise and authority. By 
controlling and designing the institutions that will contain the partnership and guide 
how actors in Cambodia interact with each other, the Bank is able to spread its 
understanding of good governance and encourage both governmental and civil society 
partners to act accordingly via incentives such as fund disbursement.
However, the Cambodian government was not a passive actor and was also able to 
exercise its own form of structural power to achieve what it wanted through the DFGG 
project. The Cambodian government was able to correctly identify that while the 
World Bank was a powerful international actor, it is also bound by its own rules, 
namely, the prohibition of political interference and its inability to strongly oppose 
country governments. Thus, the Cambodian government was able to leverage its 
position in donor-recipient relationship to its advantage. By identifying this, the 
government was able to ensure that the World Bank program would be conservative 
and unthreatening to its ability to use patronage and exploitative land and natural 
resource use strategies to its benefit. Thus, the government had nothing to lose by 
participating in the World Bank’s program. (Hughes, Hutchison, 2011, p27-8) Indeed, 
the conservative nature of the program allowed the government to choose the 
organizations with which it would form partnerships, marginalizing oppositional civil 
society while drawing in organizations willing to collaborate. (Hughes, Hutchison, 
2011, p28) Thus, the government is able to circumvent the strengthening of civil 
society groups opposing it on critical issues such as land rights and is able to instead 
channel the program into supporting groups that are inoffensive and focused on 
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service delivery. This allows it to gain legitimacy by working with civil society groups, 
potentially improve its service delivery and satisfy international donors, on which the 
country relies for a large percentage of its budget by giving the impression that reform
is being undertaken without having to upset the status quo in Cambodia. This is 
further compounded by the relatively abstract nature of the DFGG reforms that were 
adopted; the vast majority of them were technically oriented and essentially focused 
on making service delivery more efficient and transparent, posing little threat to
powerful actors involved in the Cambodian government. The intersection of the 
various types of power as outlined in Barnett’s framework for the Cambodian case 
study is summarized in the table below. Together, these forms of powers contribute to 
perpetuate a depoliticized, politically innocuous and technically focused form of good 
governance which is unlikely to result in significant empowerment and long term 
economic progress for the population beyond cooperative civil society groups.
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Figure 3:
Intersection of power in the Cambodian Demand for Good 
Governance project
Forms of Power Representation in the Cambodian case
Compulsory No significant presence found
Institutional Control of the World Bank over the content, overall 
structure and funding of the project.
Structural Cambodian government’s leverage of its position in the 
donor-recipient relationship to exclude critical civil 
society actors and curtail serious reform.
Productive Depoliticization of good governance via promotion of 
monitoring and technical solutions instead of focus on 
the political roots of ‘’bad governance’’.
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VI. Reconceptualizing Good Governance
The idea of good governance may not be beyond redemption; many of its critics agree 
on the usefulness of the core idea that good institutions are important but disagree on 
the particulars of what these institutions should look like and what the role of 
development experts should be. The Cambodian case study has served as an example 
of some of the pitfalls of the current approach, namely, the depoliticizing effect of the
Bank’s current discourse of good governance, its role as a conduit of productive power 
and technical authority for the World Bank and inability to challenge prevailing power 
structures. Thus, instead of completely abandoning the idea of good governance, 
reconceptualizing in an attempt to focus on local understandings of the concept and 
the political factors contributing to achieving it is necessary. 
Reconceptualizing good governance is necessary in order to avoid some of the issues
currently associated with the idea and to advance the concept beyond its usage as an 
extension of productive power. The Cambodian case study demonstrates that despite 
the adoption of more inclusive practices regarding the input of civil society in good 
governance projects, without a serious reconceptualization, the concept remains a 
vehicle for the World Bank’s power through depoliticization. This has the effect of 
making actual change difficult to achieve by obscuring some of the causes behind 
‘’bad governance’’ and corruption in Cambodia and proposing technical solutions 
such as increased monitoring as solutions. This reconceptualization will attempt to 
transform good governance into a concept which can motivate the creation of 
development projects that are able to build on local ideas of good governance, making 
depoliticization less likely. To do this, Merilee Grindle’s idea of ‘’good enough 
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governance’’ will be drawn on in addition to some aspects of ‘’participatory 
governance’’. 
Merilee Grindle’s concept of ‘’good enough governance’’ constitutes an improvement 
over previous conceptualizations due to its focus on the need to define and
contextualize good governance depending on the country in which governance reform 
is attempted. By locally grounding the idea of good governance, some problems can 
be avoided such as ahistorical views of institutional development leading to narrow 
technical solutions. Indeed, the effectively ahistorical nature of the World Bank’s 
conception of good governance hinders the development of better institutions in 
countries the World Bank is aiming to assist. Transparent, accountable and equitable 
government and institutions are laudable objectives but the only way these can 
become reality is through a gradual political process. Unfortunately, despite the World 
Bank’s recognition of the importance of institutions in development, its view of good 
governance and projects designed to achieve this often do not really recognize the 
eminently political reasons why existing institutions are malfunctioning or working in 
a particular manner. (Weaver, 2008, p114-5) Much like in the case of Cambodia, 
while institutions may seem to be ineffective or malfunctioning to outsiders, often, 
institutions function in such a manner for political reasons. For instance, corruption 
within institutions is endemic as it serves the government’s need to create patronage 
networks to reward supporters of the government or placate members of opposing 
political factions in order to maintain stability. The imposition of increased monitoring 
and technical accountability mechanisms can result in positive outcomes but does not 
really address these political factors and can also be easily sidestepped by 
governments who are able to accurately manoeuvre between the power of international 
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organizations and their limited ability to infringe the right of states to govern within 
their borders. 
Historically, what is often viewed as ‘’good governance’’ has almost entirely been 
borne out of domestic political processes, an unfortunate reality which minimizes the 
impact of development assistance. This does not mean that development assistance in 
the field of governance has no purpose but rather that it should focus primarily on 
serving the needs of local populations and follow their priorities rather than abstract 
uniform goals set by international organizations often disconnected from local 
contexts. To be fair, several concepts and buzzwords in the field of development such 
as ownership, partnerships, participatory development and more have been included in 
governance projects and have sought to incorporate the aspirations of local peoples 
into program design. However, this process is clearly difficult in reality and successes 
can be hard to replicate in other settings. Furthermore, there are obvious asymmetries 
of power between most local civil society groups, governments of developing 
countries and international organizations aiming to work within a country. A 
reconceptualization of good governance absolutely needs to take these factors into 
account and acknowledge that genuine inclusion and participation can only be 
achieved through accurate study and understanding of particular local institutions, 
environment, structures of power and ideas of governance. 
Following this, the idea of good governance should be decoupled from the model of 
the West and neoliberalism. As several critics have pointed out, in its current state, 
good governance is often portrayed and described as essentially an idealized version 
of Western institutions and neoliberal economic system. (Blunt, 1995; MORE?) This 
is problematic due to the fact that by presenting an idealized version of Western 
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institutions as an example of good governance, local and differing ideas of governance 
are effectively marginalized. The historical processes which led to the emergence of 
Western institutions are also often ignored in recommendations given to developing 
countries. In the worst cases, this locks them out of using similar trade and governance 
policies employed during the West’s development, effectively ‘’kicking away the 
ladder’’ and potentially creates further governance problems as countries struggle to 
conform. (Chang, 2002, Andrews, 2008) This also inherently restricts the production 
of locally adapted conceptions of governance and institutions by presenting potential 
partners in development, whether they are countries or civil society groups, with a 
clear cut model which is attractive and can certainly work but is not connected to local 
reality. It also obscures the many flaws in the Western model of good governance and 
the inexistence of good governance in its idealized form even in many Western 
countries. Transparency and accountability of institutions can take many different 
forms and measures aimed at achieving these goals are more effective when they 
reflect local history and preferences.
Ultimately, the idea of good governance as a universally defined concept should be 
abandoned in favor of a purely contextually defined version. This would allow the 
concept to move beyond its usage as a source of productive power for the World Bank 
and become a conceptual tool which can be employed by local actors to define 
priorities. Much like with Grindle’s concept of ‘’good enough governance’’, this 
would also likely result in a more restrictive view of good governance due to its 
contextually defined nature, resulting in projects with more clearly limited and 
hopefully attainable objectives.
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There is no doubt that the theoretical adoption of this reconceptualization of good 
governance by development actors would necessitate a radical shift in overall 
orientation and the form of projects. It may also be essentially impossible for large 
international organizations such as the World Bank to adopt such a concept due to 
restrictions on political activity and the potential resistance of countries working with 
the World Bank to the enactment of projects which seriously threaten the networks of
patronage and power on which governments rely. Admittedly, the clear power 
asymmetries between local governments, domestic NGOs and international 
organizations would also certainly hinder the adoption of truly locally defined ideas of 
governance over those favoured by power holders. Projects inspired by it may also fall 
victim to several of the same pitfalls as participatory development projects such as 
appropriation by local elites, misunderstanding between actors involved, political 
disagreement within local partner groups and so on. (Platteau, 2008)  Nonetheless, the 
value of this reconceptualization of good governance, primarily lies in its attempt to 
‘’democratize’’ the idea of good governance by locally grounding it and rejecting 
universals. The idea is to enable actors other than powerful international organizations 
or bilateral donor agencies to define the concept and allow others to take hold of it to
motivate projects which better reflect their priorities. 
A reconceptualization of good governance must also acknowledge that the 
achievement of good governance is not a panacea which will ensure development on 
its own. It seems clear that institutional quality has some impact on development but 
this does not entail that most development efforts should be focused on the matter. 
There remains a large swathe of development projects which are unrelated to good 
governance that remain relevant. It is also possible that capacity building projects 
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focused on other areas have spillover effects and can impact the quality of governance. 
A reconceptualization of good governance requires the acknowledgement of the 
complexity of reality and the lack of one-size fit all solutions to development or 
institution building. To be fair, projects inspired by the idea of good governance have 
gradually moved away from universalistic solutions completely divorced from local 
realities since the emergence of the concept. Despite its flaws, the case study presented 
in this dissertation integrates civil society in a certain form, which is to be lauded. 
However, this integration remains fairly limited and defined by the intersection of the 
World Bank’s need to deploy productive power and define the overarching goals of 
the project and the Cambodian government’s ability to limit the reach of the project 
and the inclusion of certain civil society groups. Furthermore, the involvement of civil 
society groups does not solve the question of popular involvement in governance 
projects considering that civil society does not and cannot represent everyone in a 
particular area. Some voices will always be louder than others and outcomes often 
reflect power dynamics within communities. (Gaventa, 2004) This remains a problem 
that a reconceptualization of good governance cannot really solve and will require 
more than conceptual innovation. However, by drawing on some of the ideas 
expressed by advocates of participatory governance and combining them with 
mandatory political analysis, there is a possibility that local networks of power can be 
exposed and their effects in agenda setting mitigated in favour of a more balanced 
approach. (Gaventa, 2004) 
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Ultimately, the reconceptualization of good governance proposed in this dissertation 
and a comparison with other major conceptions of the idea can be summarized in the 
following table.
Figure 3:






- What is ‘’good’’ is generally not defined contextually.
- Focus on efficiency of institutions, transparency,
accountability and especially anti-corruption via 
monitoring mechanisms, less on representation. 
- Good institutions lead to economic growth and 
development.
- Concerned with creating optimal institutional 




- Limited, more contextually defined definition of 
governance depending on country.
- Focus on ‘’fewer, more useful, and more feasible 
interventions’’. (Grindle, 2007)
- Minimal conditions of governance necessary for 
political and economic development to occur. 
(Grindle, 2004)
- Relation between institutions, economic growth and 
development is not straightforward. 
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- Purely contextually defined definition of governance 
arrived at on a case by case basis through interaction 
between partners. 
- Builds on good enough governance and acknowledges 
the difficulty of actually producing better good 
governance via external intervention. Any attempts 
must be rooted in political analysis of local networks 
of power.
- Governance is more than management, political 
factors must always be analysed and taken into 
account. Not all actors have the same interests. Builds 
on participatory governance by involving the concept 




In the first part of this dissertation, the history of the concept of good governance and 
its close links with the World Bank have been examined. The emergence of good 
governance was placed in its historical context as a result of the evolution of 
developmental thought regarding the role of the state, the failure of structural 
adjustment programs and the re-emergence of institutionalism. Following this, a 
review of the literature reacting to the World Bank’s promotion of good governance 
found that reactions were divided among scholars despite the widespread adoption of 
the discourse of good governance. Some scholars broadly supported the World Bank’s 
ideas and supported its discourse with facts linking good governance to income and 
growth. Others found the concept somewhat useful but took issue with the World 
Bank’s tendency to present its findings as universally valid and were worried by the 
rapid expansion of the purported benefits of good governance into all spheres of 
development, leading to the elaboration of the idea of ‘’good enough governance’’ 
among others. The idea of ‘’good enough governance’’ avoids several of the issues 
with the World Bank’s conception of good governance by essentially attempting to 
localize the idea of good governance and incorporate analyses of domestic political 
economy factors in development projects. However, a significant amount of critical 
scholars took issue with the World Bank’s adoption of good governance and criticized 
its depoliticizing and neoliberalizing effects. Interested in the motives prompting the 
Bank to suddenly embrace civil society and institutional reform in the early 1990s, 
these critics argue that the World Bank had only changed its discourse and continued 
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to push neoliberal economics on developing countries via governance reform. They 
argued that these reforms and recommendations often had the intent of marginalizing 
the state and depoliticizing governance which had the opposite effect of empowering 
society and favoured the emergence of states more attuned to the needs of 
international donors than their own citizens. In order to examine how the discourse of 
good governance translates into concrete projects, the case of the World Bank’s 
Demand for Good Governance initiative in Cambodia was examined. Viewed through 
Barnett’s framework of power in global governance, the dissertation argues that
different forms of power interacted in the Demand for Good Governance project to 
produce a depoliticized form of governance. The project contained several elements 
consistent with the critiques overviewed in the literature review section of the 
dissertation. Indeed, while the World Bank’s project was designed with sincere good 
intentions and may certainly have resulted in more efficient governmental service 
delivery to Cambodian citizens, the project remains emblematic of several of the flaws 
with the Bank’s current conceptualization of good governance, notably its technically-
oriented focus which neglects the role of politics and power in the development of 
‘’good ‘’ governance. This dissertation then proposed a reconceptualization of good 
governance based on localization and political engagement in order to attempt and 
change some of the aspects of the World Bank’s conception of good governance that 
lead to projects with major flaws like the Demand for Good Governance project in 
Cambodia. However, the proposed reconceptualization is not without its limits and, 
much like the classical conception of good governance, should not be portrayed as a 
panacea for all governance and development issues. The impact of this 
reconceptualization is also limited by the unlikeliness that it would be adopted by the 
World Bank due to its internal culture and structure. Indeed, an adoption of the new 
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good governance concept would require significant shifts in project design and in the 
Bank’s general orientation, namely that it would need to get more formally involved in 
politics and abandon the pretence of being apolitical. It would also require a different 
set of skills to navigate local politics and work with partners. However, this 
reconceptualization may find its value in its attempt to ‘’open up’’ the discourse of 
good governance to less powerful actors than international organizations and allow 
them to counter their discourse with a conception that is more flexible and adaptable 
to their own contexts. 
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Good governance의 개념은 1980년대 후반부터 세계은행을 비롯한
국제기구를 중심으로 논의되기 시작하여 개발 담론의 주요 화두로
부상하였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 이 개념은 개발 주체 간 권력관계와
신자유주의 경제를 탈정치화하려는 정책과 사업에 정당성을 확보하는데
이용되는 경향을 보여 많은 비판을 받아왔다. 본 연구는 글로벌
거버넌스의 권력에 관한 이론적 논의를 기반으로 세계은행의 캄보디아
사업 사례를 검토하여 good governance에 대한 여러 비판이 실제로
타당함을 밝힌다.
사례 연구와 더불어 good governance 에 대한 역사적 논의와 비판적 시각을
바탕으로 개념을 재정립하고, 참여와 ‘repolitization’을 통해 전적으로
맥락에 따라 정의함으로써 기존의 제기된 문제에서 벗어나 재개념화를
시도한다.
